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Abstract—In this paper, we present the design and implementation of a Systematic Inter-Component Communication Analysis
Technology (SIAT) consisting of two key modules: Monitor and Analyzer. As an extension to the Android operating system at framework
layer, theMonitor makes the first attempt to revise the taint tag approach named TaintDroid both at method-level and file-level, to migrate
it to the app-pair ICC paths identification through systemwide tracing and analysis of taint in intent both at the data flow and control flow.
By taking over the taint logs offered by the Monitor, the Analyzer can build the accurate and integrated ICC models adopted to identify
the specific threat models with the detection algorithms and predefined rules. Meanwhile, we employ the models’ deflation technology to
improve the efficiency of the Analyzer. We implement the SIAT with Android Open Source Project and evaluate its performance through
extensive experiments on well-known datasets and real-world apps. The experimental results show that, compared to state-of-the-art
approaches, the SIAT can achieve about 25%∼200% accuracy improvements with 1.0 precision and 0.98 recall at the cost of negligible
runtime overhead. Moreover, the SIAT can identify two undisclosed cases of bypassing that prior technologies cannot detect and quite
a few malicious ICC threats in real-world apps with lots of downloads on the Google Play market.
Index Terms—Android, Threats Detection, Inter-Component Communication, Taint Tags, Attack Models.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, we have witnessed explosive growth inthe number of mobile devices, and the large quantity of
diversified mobile applications (apps) on those mobile de-
vices have made our daily lives much more convenient and
enjoyable. However, with the rapid growth of mobile apps,
they have increasingly become the target of mobile malware
authors, who generally develop and distribute mobile mal-
ware that aims at stealing and disclosing various types of
sensitive and valuable information that is associated with
either mobile user or device, such as credit card number,
real-time geolocation, and International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI) number, etc. Malware has become one of
the most significant security threats to mobile operating
systems, especially Android.
In the Android system, the widely used Inter-
Component Communication (ICC) [16] plays an essential
role between the components of apps that are isolated
in different sandboxes. Apps pass messages between each
other by passing the intents, which are passive data struc-
tures holding the abstract descriptions of operations to be
performed between components. Such a flexible method
contributes a lot to functionality reuse and data sharing;
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however, it also exposes a vulnerable surface to several
security attacks. In the context of ICC mechanism scenarios,
apps whose developers overlooked security issues often
suffer from risky vulnerabilities such as intent hijacking and
spoofing [13], resulting in sensitive user data leak or priv-
ilege misuse by other apps, particularly mobile malware.
Besides, two or more malicious apps with ICC paths could
even collude on stealthy attacks that neither of them could
accomplish alone [14]. In these attacks, malicious apps send
and receive intents in a way that looks like as if those are
ordinary message exchanges. By this means, they can often
easily bypass those classical malware detection approaches
which regularly inspect apps individually.
Many existing ICC-relative researchworks [27] [25] focus
on detecting vulnerabilities in benign apps. None of these
techniques could identify ICC paths with attack behaviors.
Recently, most of the research works that aim at identifying
ICC paths with attack behaviors are in two categories: static
analysis and running protection. A static analysis approach
often extracts sensitive ICC paths by matching attributes
and tracking data flow (e.g., IC3 [26], AmanDroid [31],
DIALDroid [10]). However, even the state-of-the-art static
analysis based approaches suffer from a large number of
false positives, the reason being that they could not validate
the data format through static analysis when facing the
reflection and unreachable code. As a result, ignoring the
validation of the data format in the static analysis will lead
to an ICC path that does not occur in reality. Alternatively,
runtime protection based approaches, e.g., XManDroid [11]
and SCLib [32], either enforce mandatory access control
according to the predefined policy set or ask about the end-
user’s decision for access permission to protect them from
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attacks when apps communicate with each other using the
ICC mechanism. However, those runtime protection based
approaches only pay attention to the information acquired
before receiving intent, so that ignores actual behaviors of
the receiver. Particularly, they determine whether to prohibit
the mobile app from receiving intent according to various
information (such as app permissions, intent attributes, and
intent filter attributes), which makes these runtime protec-
tion techniques unable to provide a solution for accurately
identifying ICC paths with attack behaviors.
To overcome the shortcomings of the existing ICC-based
malware detection approaches, we propose a Systematic
ICC Analysis Technology (SIAT), which identifies ICC paths
with attack behaviors through analyzing the monitor infor-
mation of components and data flows in the ICC processes
at runtime. SIAT consists of two key modules: Monitor and
Analyzer. The Monitor recognizes the application informa-
tion exchanged by the transmission intent at runtime, and
closely monitors the spread of sensitive information in the
intent transmission process through dynamic taint analysis.
Once the Analyzer obtains the information from theMonitor,
it establishes ICC threat models (we describe the details in
Section 3) and identifies the ICC paths with attack behaviors
based on these threat models. The SIAT is able to deal with
three typical ICC related security threats, namely intent
hijacking, intent spoofing, and especially intent collusion
attack.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose the SIAT1, a more accurate systematic
approach for identifying the malicious ICCs between
apps by migrating the taint tag approach named
TaintDroid [15] to trace and analyze sensitive intent
data, depending on its two key modules, namely
Monitor and Analyzer.
• Monitor, an Android framework extension that moni-
tors intent transfers and data flows in ICC at runtime
through systemwide tracing and accurate analysis
of tainted data. In particular, the SIAT redefines the
service primitives and sensitive data for intent, and
more than eighty taint tags for tracing the sensitive
intent communications by revising the TaintDroid at
method-level and file-level.
• Analyzer, an approach for building threat models by
taking over the taint logs offered by the Monitor in
seamlessly to identify the specific threat models (i.e.,
intent hijacking, spoofing, and collusion attack) with
the identification algorithms and predefined rules.
• We have evaluated the performance of the SIAT
through extensive experiments on both malwares
and benign apps composed of several well-known
datasets and thousands of real-world Android apps.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Related works are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses
the threat models SIAT focuses on. Section 4 describes the
overall architecture of SIAT. Section 5 presents the compre-
hensive performance evaluation that we have conducted for
SIAT. Before drawing conclusion in Section 7, we introduce
the in depth discussion in Section 6.
1. https://github.com/JinxKing/SIAT.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review some of the related works that
are the starting point of our research. Inter-app threat issues
have attracted a lot of research efforts. The state-of-the-art
approaches could broadly be divided into two categories:
single-app analysis and app-pair analysis. And the analysis
approaches of each category also are in two types: static
analysis and dynamic (a.k.a., runtime) analysis.
Single-app analysis. The static single-app analysis ap-
proaches, such as [7], [19], [23], [25], [31]. CHEX [25], can
identify the component hijacking vulnerabilities through
static data flow analysis. Amandroid [31] focuses on ana-
lyzing inter-component data flows and track the interaction
of the components. FlowDroid [7] improves the precision for
static taint analysis between components in an application.
ICCTA [23] focuses on privacy leakage based on the static
taint analysis. ICCDetector [19] builds a model to detect
malwares via extracting the ICC features and training with
a set of benign apps and malwares.
The dynamic single-app analysis approaches [15], [17],
[18], [33] monitor the app at runtime. As a data flow tracing
method, TaintDroid [15] monitors the system at runtime and
tracks the taint transmission so as to detect the privacy leak-
age. IntentFuzzer [33] identifies the vulnerable interfaces
by dynamically sending test intents to the components. In-
tentDroid [17] tests eight different vulnerabilities caused by
unsafe handing of coming ICC intent data. DazeDroid [18]
fully-automated extracts the components and can fuzzing
all interfaces in apps.
App-pair analysis. In the static app-pair analysis tech-
nologies, ApkCombiner [22] directly combines two apps
into a single app and uses the single static data flow
analysis method to identify sensitive ICC methods. Both
Epicc [27] and IC3 [26] extract and analyze the information
from apps. COVERT [?] employs a compositional analysis
method for finding inter-app vulnerabilities. JITANA [30]
can analyze multiple android apps simultaneously. DidFail
[20] is designed to detect the information leakage between
activities. DIALDroid [10] analyzes each app and adopts the
database to calculate the sensitive ICC path. MRDroid [24]
builds a component interaction map based on MapReduce,
and assesses the inter-app threats of apps with the ICCmap.
Most of the dynamic app-pair analysis technologies en-
forces security policies only at the sender so as to protect
users from inter-app threats. XManDroid [11] is the first
approach proposed to prevent application-level privilege
escalation attacks through enforcing the permission policies.
FlaskDroid [12] provides mandatory access control strategy
simultaneously for both Android’s middleware and kernel
layers to prevent privilege escalation and collusive data
leak. SCLib [32] proposes an approach that performs inter-
app mandatory access control for defending against com-
ponent hijacking without modifying the Android system.
SPEAR [9] and SEALANT [21] combine the static analysis
and enforcing security policy to provide end-user protec-
tion.
Different from existing dynamic ICCs detection technologies,
SIAT, not only inspects the senders but the receivers intent
related behaviors by migrating the dynamic single-app analysis
approach TaintDroid to the systemwide tracing of intent data
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Fig. 1. The intent hijacking, spoofing and collusion attack models that
bring forth malicious ICC paths to be identified.
among multiple apps/components, to improve the accuracy of
threats detection significantly.
3 THREAT MODELS
Communications between components of mobile applica-
tion (a.k.a., app) are achieved via sending and receiving
intents, which are generally used with methods to invoke
activity, service, and broadcast receivers. In this section,
we present the generation mechanism of the malicious ICC
paths that are incurred by malwares with intent in three
typical threat models, i.e., intent hijacking, intent spoofing,
and intent collusion attack. As shown in Figure 1, the
following threat models that SIAT focuses on may lead to
different malicious ICC attack behaviors, such as privilege
escalation, sensitive data leak, and so on. It is worth noting
that SIAT mainly focuses on identifying the intent threat model
but not the specific attack behaviors.
Intent hijacking. As depicted in Figure 1, in intent
hijacking, the implicit intent may never reach the expected
component, but it is instead intercepted by an unauthorized
app. In Victim app, when the Component A sends intent to
Component B, the Malware1 app can obtain the intent by
setting the attributes matched with the intent in the intent-
filter of the component. As a result, it is easy to cause data
leakage during the process of intent hijacking. If the data
(e.g., location, contacts) requires permission to obtain, and
the intent does not restrict the receiver with permission,
Malware1 obtains the sensitive data without the necessary
permission. In this case, theMalware1 escalates the privilege
by hijacking the intent besides stealing the sensitive data.
Intent spoofing. Figure 1 illustrates how intent spoofing
works. If the Victim app discloses that the Component B
expects to receive intent from the Component A or some other
components, and it has no proper restrictions on attributes,
the Malware1 may then pretend to be Component A and
send intent to the Component B, which could trigger the
corresponding action of the Component B.
Intent collusion attack. Intent collusion attack generally
refers to the situation in which two apps work together to
accomplish malicious behaviors that a single app cannot
achieve solely by itself. As Figure 1 shows, Component D
in Malware1 sends an intent with location data to Malware2.
Afterwards, Component E receives the intent and then sends
out the SMS message with location data. Since all these
actions can be performed in the background, it is difficult for
users to perceive. To make things worse, it is very difficult to
identify each app as a malware if merely inspecting its own
behavior separately. During the process of intent collusion
attack, themalicious apps pretend to communicate normally
with each other, which brings great challenges to identify
those apps successfully as malwares.
Application Layer
Android Framework Layer (Monitor)
App A
findSenderComponent()
getDetailsofIntent()addTaintToData()
identifyTaintData(T-
data)
Intent
(5)
Mutiple ClassesSingle Class
identifyTaintData(T-data)
Interaction between Two LayersProcess in Apps
App B
Analyzer
findAllCandidate()
findReceiver()
Taint Logs
Build Model
T
a
in
tD
ro
id
Attack Behavior 
Detection
(1) (2) (3)
(4)
Attack 
Types
Logs
In
te
n
t P
rim
itiv
e
s
Fig. 2. The architecture of SIAT. The five functions cooperate with
TaintDroid to trace the intent via the intent primitives.
Coincidental malicious ICCs. Furthermore, not only do
we need to distinguish the aforementioned malicious ICCs
from ordinary application communications, but we also need
to differentiate the malicious ICC with ‘coincidental malicious
ICC’, which is omitted or lacks accurate analysis in the existing
research efforts. If some developers do not have strict control
over the attributes of the intent or intent-filter, which may
lead to an accidental match between the apps, then when an
app receives data from the intent, it may find out that the
data do not meet the requirements of the intent, which will
cause the app to stop execution. Especially if the ICC path
is incorrectly considered to involve sensitive APIs, it will
be classified as a sensitive ICC path and thus be regarded
as an initiative attack path launching by a malware, in this
situation, the ICC path is called a ‘coincidental malicious
ICC’. Ignoring that can result in high false positive rates.
We showcase the solution of this issue in Section 5.2.
4 THE SIAT
This section introduces the SIAT, which can identify the
malicious ICCs with attack behaviors by analyzing the real-
time intent information and its data and control flows.
4.1 Architecture Overview
As a starting point, Figure 2 presents the architecture of the
proposed SIAT, which consists of two key modules: Monitor
and Analyzer. By analyzing the data tainted with tailored
TaintDroid [15] and redefined intent service primitives, the
SIAT provides a real-time systematic tracing of privacy-
sensitive data and attack visibility into how the collaborative
malicious behaviors take place via intent.
The Monitor’s main contributions lie in the migration
of Taintdroid to ICC attack identification not only at the
data flow but at the control flow. Relying on the main five
functions, as shown in Figure 2, the Monitor extends the
framework layer of the current Android operating system
based on the Android Open Source Project. By cooperate
with core methods of TaintDroid via intent primitives, the
Monitor inspects the relevant components on an ICC path
and the data and control flow associated with the intent
at runtime, and further identifies the intent’s sender, the
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Application Layer
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Fig. 3. The overall workflow (data flow and control flow) of Monitor in inter-component communication.
intent-matched component, and the receiver at several crit-
ical points of the ICC process. In Figure 2, the single and
multiple classes denote the number of classes involved in
the implementations of functions of Monitor. The overall
workflow of Monitor is listed as follows:
(1) Set Taint. When the sender gets sensitive data from
sensitive source, using the function addTaintToData(),
the Monitor taints the sensitive data (e.g., location, phone
number) and adds a variable tag (an 8-bit taint number) to
it, which clearly labels its source. In this paper, we name the
sensitive data tainted as T-data.
(2) Check Intent. When the sender sets the intent at-
tributes (e.g. extra, action), the Monitor checks the T-data
to see whether or not it is tainted or retainted through the
function identifyTaintData(T-data).
(3) Sending Intent. If there is a sender that calls
the system API to send an intent, the Monitor identi-
fies the identity of the sender and the details of the
intent using functions findSenderComponent() and
getDetailsofIntent().
(4) Receiving Intent. Upon obtaining the best matched
component, the Monitor is able to find out all candidates as
well as the real receiver of intent by means of the functions
findAllCandidate() and findReceiver().
(5) Check Taint. When the receiver extracts the T-data
from an intent, as long as the it calls the sensitive APIs, the
Monitor will check if any parameter in the APIs is T-data so
as to identify the source of the data by utilizing the function
identifyTaintData().
As depicted in Figure 2, the Analyzer needs to analyze
the APK (the abbreviation of AndroidPackage) files and
obtain the app’s attributes and component information, to
build a complete ICC model with the taint logs generated
by the Monitor. According to the matching results of the
ICC information with the predefined rules, theAnalyzer then
determines whether there is any aforementioned ICC threat
model or not, so that we can distinguish malwares from
benign apps. More details regarding the Monitor and the
Analyzer are presented in Section 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2 Monitor
4.2.1 TaintDroid Migration
To best suit our requirements, we need to migrate the taint
tag method TaintDroid to trace sensitive intent data not
only at the data flow but at the control flow, as shown in
Figure 3. Thus we revised the TaintDroid for inspecting
the specific data flow as well as control flow of sensitive
data in the ICC process, so that the Monitor can trace the
flow of privacy-sensitive data at runtime, which basically
meets our requirements of taint analysis. In particular, the
SIAT defines a set of intent service primitives and more than
eighty taint tags for analyzing the sensitive intent data flows
by revising the TaintDroid at method-level as well as file-
level as follows.
Firstly, as highlighted in Figure 2, we have defined a set
of service primitives for intent communications, which en-
capsulate the sensitive data operation functions and works
as a middleware between the core methods of TaintDroid
and the Android intent mechanism by method-level and
file-level revisions. The new intent primitives encapsulate
the functions of returning the source of current taint, ob-
taining the next tag with original taint, setting/getting the
tags, and so on. In this way, the main five functions at
the framework layer shown in Figure 2 are able to coop-
erate with TaintDroid efficiently. For instance, when apps
call APIs to get those privacy-sensitive data, based on the
function addTaintToData(data) in Figure 3, we taint the
data as the T-data by which we can trace and distinguish the
data from others. Also, we can extract the tag from T-data
and identified the T-data by comparing the number with the
function identifyTaintData(T-data). The bit vector of
tag is null if the data is not tainted.
Secondly, by revising the main files of TaintDroid,
our Monitor defines a group of new sensitive data
and eighty taint tags for identifying them in in-
tent communications. For example, the sensitive lo-
cation data, TAINT_LOCATION_Latitude=0x00010004,
TAINT_LOCATION_Longitude=0x00010008. Not only
do we consider the privacy-sensitive data (e.g., locations,
contacts, phone state) as sensitive, but we also regard the
information that the user inputs or acquires from other files,
other content providers (e.g., Shareference,)2 as sensitive.
Afterward, to inspect the sensitive data in interested
APIs, we take advantage of a machine-learning technology
for achieving the most likely source and sink methods [28].
4.2.2 Monitor Implementation
Figure 3 demonstrates the specific work mechanism ofMon-
itor in ICC process. As mentioned before, the main task of
Monitor is to identify the sender, the receiver, and the data
flow between them. To monitor the data flow and control
2. Shareference is a persistent storage method provided by Android.
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flow in the ICC process, the two key challenges the Monitor
have to deal with are: firstly, where the data in the intent by
the sender initially comes from; secondly, where the data in
intent finally goes to in the receiver. In this regard, the data is
tagged as tainted if it comes from a privacy-sensitive source.
All possible ways the information could leave the device is
represented as Sink. If the tainted data is found in the Sink,
there may be an inevitable leakage of the privacy-sensitive
data. The main challenge of designing theMonitor lies in the
accurate identification and recording of the delivery chain of
the privacy-sensitive data at runtime among multiple apps.
We describe the design and implementation of Monitor by
answering the following four questions:
Is there any sensitive data in the intent? When apps
provide data for an intent, based on the T-data, we in-
spect the parameters of the data to see if it has been
tainted with the function identifyTaintData(T-data).
If so, the tainted data will be retained with a new
variable tag and a source code to show the source of
the intent clearly. If not, the data will be tainted and
marked as from this specific intent. We have defined
more than eighty types of tags to identify the sensi-
tive data, e.g., TAINT_sharepreference=0x00010018,
TAINT_network_state=0x00010012. In this way, the
Analyzer can easily figure out where the sensitive data comes
from in the receiver at runtime.
Who is the sender of the intent? When an app sends
an intent, we need to capture the sending event and the in-
formation of the source component. The operation of calling
API (e.g., startService(intent)) for sending an intent
is generally inherited from another class for Activity
or Service component. The BroadcastReceiver will
execute the calling operation by acquiring the Context
object and using the API in Context. As Figure 3
shows, in practice, the implementation of these APIs is
in the ContextWrapper class. Therefore, by integrating
the codes for the functions of findSenderComponent()
and getDetailsofIntent() into the ContextWrapper
class, we will immediately notice whenever an intent is sent.
Then, we can utilize the Java refection method to figure out
which component calls the API to send the intent and which
package the component belongs to.
Who is the receiver of the intent? After capturing the
sending event, we want to know which component becomes
the candidate as its attributes match with those of the intent,
and which component receives the intent at the end. In our
design, we integrate two functions findAllCandidate()
and findReceiver() into the PackageManageService
(PMS) for querying the components that match with the
intent by traversing the components of all apps as can-
didates. There are three types of components involved in
the intent matching: first, for the receiving component of
Activity, if there are more than one matched compo-
nents, the PMS selects one component from the list of
candidates through comparing their priorities, such as the
preferred order and so on. Alternatively, the PMS can also
ask the user to choose one component; secondly, for the
receiving component of Service, the Monitor will choose
the first candidate; thirdly, for the receiving component of
broadcast receiver, the PMS sends intent to all can-
didates. Therefore we can monitor all candidates and the
actual receiver of intent in PMS.
How does the receiver use the sensitive data ex-
tracted from intent? The Monitor inspects the data out-
putted to a file or sent to another device so as to de-
termine whether it is tainted. If it is, the Monitor identi-
fies the source of the data through the tag in theT-data
with function identifyTaintData(T-data). Therefore,
it can indicate the way how the receiver uses the data
extracted from intent. Also, we take more sensitive meth-
ods into consideration in the Monitor, such as the meth-
ods to store data in Shareference and database (e.g.,
Editor.putString()). It is worth noting that these sensi-
tive methods don’t need to apply for permissions; thus they
could easily be overlooked.
4.3 Analyzer
The Analyzer takes over the taint logs outputted by the
Monitor in a seamless way to build the ICC models and
further identify the specific threat models by matching with
the identification algorithm and predefined rules in the
following two essential parts.
4.3.1 Model Building
As Table 1 depicts, a threat model to be built in Analyzer is
composed of three objects, including the Sender, the Intent,
and the Receiver. To ensure efficiency, we only adopt the
most useful attributes, e.g., the taint data, which denotes the
new sensitive data for intent. Based on Table 1, there are two
key technologies below for building models:
Intent data extraction. To build accurate threat models,
the Analyzer needs to extract the intent related information
from logs. Firstly, the Analyzer needs to extract information
such as package names and permissions of each app by
analyzing the APK files. The package names enable the
Analyzer to obtain the process ID of the app, which is a
unique identifier assigned to each app by the Android
system. Every log contains a process ID that is associated
with the app, which generates the log. Secondly, based on
the process ID, the Analyzer filters all uncorrelated logs that
are from the Android system itself and the other apps,
and only retains the logs regarding the apps that we are
interested in. Thirdly, the Analyzer reads every filtered log
and extracts the intent relevant information that is useful
for building the ICC models. According to the information
extracted from the logs, as shown in Table 1, theAnalyzer can
straightly acquire the attributes in intent, the source methods
in the sender, and the startCompt and sink methods in the
receiver.
Furthermore, the Analyzer needs extra work to analyze
the attributes related to the permissions in the models by
identifying the attribute permissions required in the sender
based on the permissions required to generate the tainted
data in the intent. The attribute permissions required in the
receiver is adopted to implement the sink method. Hence, for
the sender, the attribute permissions lacked denotes the one
that the sender doesn’t have, but the receiver requires, and
vice versa, for the receiver.
Models deflation. After extracting the information re-
quired for detecting ICC process, the Analyzer is able to
build the ICC models in an efficient first-in-first-out way
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TABLE 1
The most useful attributes of application and intent adopted in our ICC
model analysis.
Sender Intent Receiver
process ID action process ID
package categories package
components type components
permissions required scheme permissions required
permissions lacked taint data1 permissions lacked
source methods1 · · · sink methods
candidates taint dataN startCompt
1 The sensitive method where the tainted data comes from.
so as to stay consistent with the Android intent mechanism.
Firstly, the Analyzer starts the building process with the logs
generated by the APIs called for sending an intent. After
that, whenever the Analyzer detecting the other log data
comes from the APIs called for sending an intent, it will
restart to build a new one after building the current ICC
model successfully. While this straightforward design leads
to a models inflation challenge we have to deal with due to
the following two reasons:
Model B
App1
C1 C2T-data T-data
Model A
App2
C3 C4T-data
Model C
T-data
T-data
Fig. 4. The threat models of multiple components.
Firstly, there are redundant models generated by the
multi-hop intent transfers between multiple components,
as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 depicts the generation of
redundant models (Model A, B and C) built by the process
mentioned above based on the four components in a stream-
lined way. It is incorrect in that the source or destination of
the sensitive data tainted as T-data is not the real component
who sends or accepts the intent. In Model B and Model C,
the T-data’s source is considered as C2 and C3 respectively,
however, the real source and destination is C1 of Model A
and C4 of Model C respectively.
Secondly, there are extra models generated by the An-
droid for launching the internal components that we are
not concerning. For instance, if the destination component
is activity and there are more than one matching with the
intent attributes, the Android will deliver the intent named a
to the ResolverActivity firstly to let the user choose the
desired component. After the user selecting the destination
component, instead of the sender, the ResolverActivity
then transfers a new intent named b to the destination.
To address the models’ inflation issue, the Analyzer takes
advantage of a deflation technology to eliminate the re-
dundant models as follows. The deflation technology can
build an ordered model list based on the components in
the sender and the receiver of a single model. It then
traverses each model to compare the taint tag for identifying
the real source in the sender and the destination/sink in
Algorithm 1 Threat models identification
Input: models⇐ all models
Output: ModelT ypes⇐ a map of model and type
1: Let model be a model in models.
2: Let sender be the sender object in a model.
3: Let intent be the intent object in a model.
4: Let rcver be the receiver object in a model.
5: for each model ∈ models do
6: for each component ∈ sender.components do
7: if component ∈ Intent.candidates then
8: add (model, “hijacking”) to ModelT ypes
9: continue
10: end if
11: end for
12: if (rcver.taintleak = true) ∧ (sender.lackpms =
null) then
13: add (model, “hijacking”) to ModelT ypes
14: else if (sender.lackpms 6= null) ∧ (rcver.lackpms =
null) then
15: add (model, “spoofing”) to ModelT ypes
16: else if (rcver.startCompt = true) ∧
(rcver.lackpms = null) then
17: add (model, “spoofing”) to ModelT ypes
18: else if (sender.lackpms 6= null) ∧ (rcver.lackpms 6=
null) then
19: add (model, “collusion”) to ModelT ypes
20: end if
21: end for
the receiver, respectively. In this way, the three models in
Figure 4 will be condensed into one, and the Analyzer is
able to figure out if the final receiver C4 starts a private
component to leak out the sensitive data after receiving
the intent. Similarly, the proposed deflation technology also
can remove the unnecessary and interfering models come
from the Android system’s internal components. For the
example mentioned above of ResolverActivity in the
second reason, using the deflation technology, the Analyzer
is able to simplify the two models in the intent transfer
process as one by executing the following steps: replacing
the sender of intent b with the sender of a and then keeping
the intent b meanwhile discarding the a.
4.3.2 Threat Models Identification
The Analyzer implements Algorithm 1 to identify the possi-
ble threat models in the ICC models after the previous steps
for building all models. According to the attributes in Table
1, Algorithm 1 considers five different cases, which cover
all attack types we target in this paper and iterates through
each model to find the best matching case.
Case 1 (line 6-11): Algorithm 1 traverses all components
in the sender app to examine carefully if the list of candidates
contains a component from the sender when the receiver
component does not belong to the sender. If so, we add the
model and the attack type “hijacking” to ModelTypes. In
this case, we deem that the instance illustrated in Figure
1 is happening and the candidate component from the
sender should be the real destination instead of the receiver
component. Therefore, the receiver component hijacks the
intent, which is supposed to be sent to another component.
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Case 2 (line 12-13): If there is some data from the intent
used by a specific sensitive method in the receiver while
the sender has the permissions related to sensitive method
in the receiver, we add the model and the attack type
“hijacking” to ModelTypes. Afterward, the data extracted
from the intent will be utilized by the sensitive method in
the receiver, which means the receiver proactively acquires
the private data from the sender through obtaining the
intent. The situation that the sender lacks the permission
related to sensitive method in the receiver is considered as
illegal behavior and is classified as another type of threat.
Case 3 (line 14-15): When the sender lacks the permission
that the receiver needs for calling a sensitive method in
the ICC process, but the receiver does have the permission
for the data from the sender, we determine that the sender
sends the intent for spoofing the receiver, and then assign
the attack type in ModelTypes as intent “spoofing”. In
this case, the sender will let the receiver do something
that the sender cannot do without the necessary permission
for it. Therefore, the receiver’s privileges will be misused
unexpectedly.
Case 4 (line 16-17): When the receiver starts a private
component with the permissions for the data from the
sender, we think the receiver is spoofed and thus add the
model and the attack type to ModelTypes. Under this
circumstance, the sender calls a private component via the
other exposed components and will not trigger any illegal
behavior.
Case 5 (line 18-19): When the sender lacks the permis-
sions that the receiver needs for calling a sensitive method,
meanwhile the receiver also lacks the permission for gen-
erating data from the sender, we consider that they are
colluding and thus add the type intent “collusion” attack to
ModelTypes, indicating that they are escalating the privi-
lege from each other as well as complementing permissions
for each other through the inter-component communication
process, which is a clear case of intent collusion attack.
4.4 The Complexity
The complexity of SIAT depends on the number of apps
and components at runtime. Since the complexity ofMonitor
mainly relies on the actual lifetime of the app, thus here
we focus on analyzing the complexity of Analyzer. Assume
all feasible ICC models between n apps which per app
contains m components need to be analyzed in the SIAT.
For every component, there are (nm − 1) components to
communicate with. In practical, if only the vulnerable paths
between two different apps could incur malicious attacks,
there are
(
nm
1
)
×
((n−1)m
1
)
models in this situation. Therefore,
the computation complexity of building the ICC Models is
O(n2m2), the complexity of identifying the threat model is
O(n2m3).
5 EVALUATIONS
This section presents the experimental evaluation results of
SIAT based on the four datasets below:
• DroidBench3.0 [2], which is an app collection for
benchmarking ICC-based sensitive data leaks and
consists of many types of ICC-related attacks.
DIALDroid Amandroid XManDroid SIAT
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Precision
Recall
F-Measure
Fig. 5. Comparisons of three accuracy metrics.
• IccTA [1], which has three sets of apps for testing the
inter-app collusion issues, and was released by EC
SPRIDE Secure Software Engineering Group.
• Our Developments, which is similar to the Droid-
Bench3.0 and consists of more than forty self-
developed apps that only have simple threat mod-
els and functions for comprehensive testing, and
twenty-six ICC processes covering at least three com-
ponents with various sensitive APIs. Concerning the
efficiency and accuracy, the intent call entries are
consistent with the app entries to simplify the call
graph, and each app-pair ICC is independent of each
other.
• Real-World, which contains about 2100 real-world
apps downloaded from the Google Play market [4].
Our evaluation addresses the following three questions:
• RQ1. What is the accuracy of SIAT compared to state-
of-the-art approaches?
• RQ2. How well does SIAT perform in practice? What
could SIAT find in real-world applications?
• RQ3. What about the individual performance of the
Monitor and the Analyzer?
5.1 Results for RQ1 (Accuracy)
We compare the SIAT with the state-of-the-art approaches
introduced in Section 2 (i.e., well-known static approaches
DIALDroid and AmanDroid, and runtime technology
XManDroid) for ICC vulnerability detection.
Figure 5 and Table 2 provide an overview of the compar-
isons of accuracy. The details of ICC paths detected are listed
in Tables 3 and 4. In particular, to ensure that the inter-app
attacks could be launched in Real-World, as we will explain
in Section 5.2, we have analyzed thousands of suspicious
apps to eliminate most of them. For instance, we firstly
manually inspected the codes of every application to inves-
tigate if each identified ICC path was indeed vulnerable.
After injecting some codes into the Android system, we can
further identify via the system debug outputs if the mali-
cious activities have been launched to exploit the vulnerable
application successfully. Although we have identified more
than twenty malicious ICC paths in Real-World, here we
randomly choose seventy-five apps from Real-World which
only cover eight ICC paths, as shown in Table 2 and 4.
5.1.1 Accuracy Comparisons Overview
As depicted in Figure 5 and Table 2, we employ three
performance indicators to evaluate the accuracy: Precision,
denoted by p, which is the fraction of related instances
among the retrieved instances; Recall, denoted by r, which
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TABLE 2
Overview of comparisons of accuracy between DIALDroid, Amandroid, XManDroid and SIAT.
DataSet
Number Malicious ICC Paths(
∑
X/
∑
⊗) Precision(p =
∑
X/(
∑
X+
∑
⊗))/Recall(r =
∑
X/number of ICC) F-Measure(2pr/(p + r))
Apps ICC DIALDroid Amandroid XManDroid SIAT DIALDroid Amandroid XManDroid SIAT DIALDroid Amandroid XManDroid SIAT
DroidBench3.0 11 9 7/2 0/0 9/0 9/0 0.78/0.78 0/0 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00 0.75 0.00 0.94 1.00
IccTA 6 3 3/0 3/0 3/0 3/0 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Our Developments 40 26 10/2 5/0 19/2 26/0 0.83/0.38 1.00/0.19 0.90/0.73 1.00/1.00 0.52 0.32 0.81 1.00
Real-World 75 8 5/10 2/4 6/8 7/0 0.33/0.63 0.33/0.25 0.43/0.75 1.00/0.88 0.43 0.28 0.55 0.93
Total 132 46 25/14 10/4 37/10 45/0 0.64/0.54 0.71/0.21 0.78/0.80 1.00/0.98 0.59 0.32 0.79 0.99
The ICC path in Table 2 and 3 denotes the malicious ICC path incurring attack behaviors. X=True Positive, ⊗=False Positive, ⊙=False Negative.
TABLE 3
The partial results of ICC paths detection in DroidBench3.0, IccTA and Our Developments. The attack behaviors of Real-World are listed in the
Table 4.
Dataset Source Destination Num. of ICC Paths DIALDroid Amandroid XManDroid SIAT(Ours)
DroidBench3.0
SendSMS Echoer 1 X ⊗ ⊙ X X
StartActivityForResult1 Echoer 1 X ⊗ ⊙ X X
DeviceId Broadcast1 Collector 1 X ⊙ X X
DeviceId ContentProvider1 Collector 1 X ⊙ X X
DeviceId OrderedIntent1 Collector 1 X ⊙ X X
DeviceId Service1 Collector 1 ⊙ ⊙ X X
Location1 Collector 1 X ⊙ X X
Location Broadcast1 Collector 1 X ⊙ X X
Location Service1 Collector 1 ⊙ ⊙ X X
IccTA
startActivity1 source startActivity1 sink 1 X X X X
startService1 source startService1 sink 1 X X X X
startbroadcast1 source startbroadcast1 sink 1 X X X X
Our Developments
Sender0 ReceiverTest0 1 X X X X
Sender0 ReceiverTest1 1 X X X X
Sender0 ReceiverTest2 1 X X X X
Sender0 Receiver-shareference 1 ⊙ ⊙ ⊙ X
Sender0 Receiver-application 1 ⊙ ⊙ ⊙ X
Sender1 ReceiverTest0 1 ⊙ ⊙ X X
Sender1 ReceiverTest1 1 ⊙ ⊙ X X
Sender1 ReceiverTest2 1 ⊙ ⊙ X X
Sender1 Receiver-shareference 1 ⊙ ⊙ ⊙ X
Sender1 Receiver-application 1 ⊙ ⊙ ⊙ X
is the fraction of the total amount of relevant instances that
are actually retrieved; F-measure [3], which computes the
comprehensive score 2×p×r
p+r . Figure 5 depicts the value of
three indicators in total. It is worth noting that the ICC
path in this section denotes the malicious ICC path incurring
attack behaviors.
As we can see, in Figure 5, the DIALDroid merely ob-
tains 0.64 precision and 0.54 recall in total. The DAILDroid
performs static taint analysis to identify attributes of the
intent and the intent-filter, to trace the data flow associated
with the intent. Then it uses SQL stored procedures and
queries to calculated sensitive channels in the database
according to the matching rules between the intent and the
intent-filter. However, the DAILDroid cannot accurately tell
whether the data in the intent meets the requirements of the
receiving component. When the data format doesn’t meet
the requirements in the program, the sensitive method will
not be executed. But the DAILDroid does not consider it and
determines that the sensitive method must be executed if the
intent attributes do match. In addition, DIALDroid treats
the cases that sensitive data arrives in other applications
via intent as a privacy breach, which improves the overall
coverage while introducing false positives. Similarly, the
AmanDroid achieves 0.71 precision and 0.21 recall in that
it cannot analyze the data flow when dealing with the
complex ICC paths.
As shown in Figure 5 and Table 2, the XManDroid
obtains 0.73 recall on Our Developments due to the seven
ICC paths suffering from intent spoofing, which the XMan-
Droid cannot identify. Consequently, the XManDroid only
achieves a precision of 0.78 and a recall of 0.80 in total.
The XManDroid enables users to predefine a list of ICC
restriction policies and automatically block ICCs that match
with any policy. These policies are based on the permissions
in the sender and the data in intent. Thanks to its permis-
sion identification mechanism, which will not intercept the
deliver of intent only if the permissions in the receiver match
the ones in the sender, the XManDroid performs well both
on IccTA and DroidBench3.0, as shown in Table 2. However,
when the sender sends out the sensitive data with the
permission that the receiver doesn’t have, the XManDroid
prohibits this ICC directly without considering whether the
receiver uses the data later. This case is a common problem
in many runtime protection approaches, which raises a high
false alarm rate. For example, the experimental results on
Our Developments shows that even the receiver does not
extract any sensitive data from intent, the XManDroid still
thinks there is a malicious behavior without identifying the
receiver’s behaviors, which makes the XManDroid detect
two false positives⊗. In contrast, the SIAT traces both of the
data flows in the senders and receivers, then analyzes the
whole transmission process that enables SIAT to generate
less false negatives than the XManDroid.
Compared to the existing approaches, as depicted in
Figure 5 and Table 2, the proposed SIAT can achieve about
25%∼200% accuracy improvements with 1.0 precision and
0.98 recall in total, even though it is unable to trace a few
output methods due to the limits of the built-in TaintDroid.
There are two reasons why SIAT performs much better: firstly,
unlike the DAILDroid and the XManDroid, SIAT traces the
data flow in the receiver at runtime through capturing and
verifying the data in sensitive method, which makes SIAT acquire
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Fig. 6. Two cases of bypassing in the receiver.
more precise data flows; secondly, DIALDroid, AmanDroid, and
XManDroid do not detect intent spoofing, which is one of the
major reasons why their precision is lower than ours. Therefore,
SIAT is able to achieve the analysis results which are more closer
to the real situations happened between apps than DAILDroid in
the above scenario.
5.1.2 Details of ICC Path Detection
Table 3 shows details of malicious ICC paths of DroidBench
3.0 and IccTA, and only ten malicious ICC paths of Our
Developments due to the paper limits. The ICC paths in
Real-World are given in Section 5.2. It is worth noting that
the original three ICC paths in IccTA are innocent since the
receivers can get the device ID from intent by itself with
the related permissions. To make the ICC paths illegal, we
delete the permissions for device ID in the three receivers.
The results in DroidBench 3.0 for DIALDroid are much
better than AmanDroid; nevertheless, there still are two
deficiencies: the first one is that the DIALDroid cannot
identify the malicious ICC path when the type of the
component is Service; obviously, there are two cases for
the two source apps named DeviceId_Service1 and
Location_Service1; the second one is that the DIAL-
Droid simply considers all possible branches to be executed
when facing many branches in source codes, e.g., for desti-
nation app named Echoer, the two branches in codes make
the DIALDroid detect two false malicious ICC paths.
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the DIALDroid
ignores the receiver’s real requirements of the intent data
formats, leading to extra false positives. For instance,
in Real-World dataset, for app vbox7handler, it will
exit immediately if the data in the intent does not have
vbox7 $\backslash$.com $\backslash/$play.
However, DIALDroid still constructs the vulnerable ICC
path between the sender and the vbox7handler. For
another app named UrlToPdf, after receiving the intent, it
will output the data to logs only if it identifies there is a key-
value pair with the key android.intent.extra.TEXT in
the vector EXTRA of the data in the intent. Nevertheless, the
DIALDroid still considers that the log should be triggered
since it doesn’t care if the receiver validates the data or not.
While SIAT can distinguish whether or not the log function
should be triggered.
On the other hand, all four approaches can achieve good
detection results on IccTA, regarding the simple ICC paths
in 3-pair apps. Since the AmanDroid cannot analyzer the
data flows when facing the complex ICC paths, it cannot
detect any malicious ICC path in DroidBench 3.0.
Listing 1. The Component A puts the sensitive data into Shareference.
public class Component A extends AppCompatActivity {
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
...
Intent receivedIntent=getIntent() ;
receivedIntent.setClass( this , MyService.class);
Editor editor=getSharedPreferences(”settings”, 0) . edit
() ;
String id=receivedIntent.getStringExtra(”android.
intent.extra .TEXT”);
if (id != null) {
editor .putString(”deviceId”, id) ;
editor .commit();
}
startService (receivedIntent) ;
}
}
Listing 2. The Component B gets the sensitive data from Shareference
and then outputs them.
public class Component B extends Service {
public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int
startId ) {
Log.v(”leakData”, getSharedPreferences(”settings”, 0).
getString(”deviceId”, ”default”)) ;
return super.onStartCommand(intent, flags, startId);
}
}
5.1.3 Two Cases of Bypassing
The bypassing is similar to the malware collusion in a way,
i.e., two components try to work cooperatively so that each
component only performs part of the behavior to bypass the
detection. Nevertheless, the main difference is that the two
components come from the same application in the above
cases of bypassing. Based on extensive experiments and in
depth analysis, as depicted in Figure 6, in the receiver, we
discover the following two undisclosed cases of malicious
bypassing which can invalidate the existing approaches by
taking advantage of especial intermediate methods/objects:
The first case is that, as shown in Figure 6, in the
receiver, if the Component A stores the sensitive data into the
Shareference in the form of a key-value pair after receiving
the intent. Subsequently, the Component B can extract the
data from the Shareference object and further output the data
to the outside of the device. Listing 1 and 2 present example
codes to showcase the bypassing in this case.
Similarly, in the second case, component A assigns the
data extracted from the intent to the variable of the Appli-
cation object after receiving the intent. It is worth noting
that there is a unique Application object per Android app
at runtime so that each component can find the same one.
Afterward, another component B can extract the data from
the intent by searching the variable in the Application object,
and then calls the APIs for sending the SMS or writing
in a file to output the data to the outside of the device as
aforementioned.
We have successfully realized the above two
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bypassing cases in Our Developments with des-
tination named Receiver-shareference and
Receiver-application, as shown in Table 3. For
the first case, both DAILDroid and AmanDroid only
can notice that the Component A has stored the sensitive
data in the Shareference, but cannot detect that Component
B has obtained the sensitive data from the Shareference,
and its following malicious behaviors. For the second
case, we employ DIALDroid and AmanDroid to try to
detect the app-pair in several detection rounds. However,
the results obtained by the two approaches show that
there is no leak of sensitive data from the intent in the
receiver. Consequently, malicious apps can easily bypass
the detection of DIALDroid and AmanDroid in this case.
Also, the XManDroid cannot detect the two cases due to its
omitting of the actual behavior of the receiver, which incurs
the false negatives ⊙.
Based on the workflow for monitoring Shareference in
Figure 7 and the identification algorithm of the original
sources of tainted data for the bypassing in Algorithm 2,
we showcase the solution of bypassing as follows:
Depending on a systemwide real-time tracing of the
tainted data for Shareference, as shown in Figure 7, the
Monitor firstly taints the original sensitive data with a tag
and then retaints the data as T-data′ (T-data′ ← T-data) when
storing it in an intent. After being delivered to the receiver
with intent, whatever it has experienced in the receiver, only
if the T-data′ is utilized as the parameter of some sensitive
function which is used to store data and then output them
out of the device, our Monitor will identify the T-data′ and
figure out its original source by comparing the taint tag
and the predefined source code. In this way, as depicted in
Figure 7, when the corresponding component puts or gets
the T-data′ via the Class(Shareference), and further
sends the T-data′ out of the device, the functions that use the
T-data′ will be monitored by theMonitor. TheMonitor is able
to discover the T-data′ as the tainted parameter immediately
and then search the tag in it to find out the original sender of
it. Afterward, based on the improvedmodels built by the Al-
gorithm 2, which is adopted to identify the original sources
of the tainted data with taint logs given the intermediate
methods/objects, the Analyzer is capable of determining
whether the T-data′ in the functions above are the T-data′
in the sender’s intent according to the information provided
by theMonitor. It is worth noting that, different from the Ap-
Algorithm 2 Identification of original source of tainted data
for bypassing
Input: m ⇐ current model needs to find original source of
tainted data
Output: m⇐ improved model contains the original source
of tainted data;
1: Let models be the models generated before
2: Let model be a model in models.
3: Let sender be the sender object in a model.
4: Let intent be the intent object in a model.
5: Let rcver be the receiver object in a model.
6: Let tdata be the tainted data in a model.
7: Let source[tdata] be the source method of tdata.
8: for each tdata ∈ m.rcver.tdatas do
9: if (tdata ∈ m.intent.tdatas) then
10: m.source[tdata]←model.sender
11: end if
12: for eachmodel ∈ models do
13: if (model.rcver.component=m.sender.component)∧
(tdata ∈ model.intent.tdatas) then
14: m.source[tdata]←model.source[tdata]
15: continue
16: end if
17: end for
18: for eachmodel ∈ models do
19: if tdata ∈ model.intent.tdatas then
20: m.source[tdata]←model.source[tdata]
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
plication, we implement the Algorithm 2 for the Shareference
through a taint value matching mechanism to trace the data
flow based on the particular key-value pairs putting/getting
entries in logs. To improve the original sources of the tainted
data in the models, Algorithm 2 matches the tainted data in
intent with the data in the receiver iteratively.
Therefore, both the functions utilized to store the T-data′
in Application or Shareference in Component A, and the func-
tions utilized to get T-data′ from Application or Shareference in
Component B, cannot eliminate the taint tag in T-data′ so that
the malicious behaviors never could bypass our approach to
send sensitive data out of the device.
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TABLE 4
Analysis results on real-world apps.
Sender Receiver
Type
Name Version Component Sensitive Data Name Version Component Sensitive Method
TopGoodNightImages 10 StartActivity string-extra TraductoresScout 33 MainActivity Log hijacking
PEC2012 24 MoreTabActivity string-extra Prizmshare 2 MainActivity write spoofing
SimCardManager 20400 Main deviceId Notepad 50 NoteEditActivity fileOutputStream collusion
fotoalbumgpslite 8 ImageActivity location silentcamera 13 CameraActivity — —
lowlevel.sendapp 11 Application — urlripper 72 ProcessIntent — —
The string-extra here denotes the string extra field in intent. ‘—’ denotes the false positive case.
5.2 Results for RQ2 (How SIAT performs on Real-World
Apps)
We run Real-World applications by adopting the automated
testing script to trigger the applications’ behaviors in the
system for detection purposes. For each app, we have to
write the corresponding scripts to run the test with mon-
keyrunner [6], which is a popular Android tool for running
test suites. It is a time-consuming task to handle a large
number of apps in this way. To save the testing time and
effort for the apps without ICCs, we first exploit the static
analysis approaches to find out the apps that holding the
ICC paths, and then analyze the other apps one by one and
write the corresponding scripts for them; finally, we run the
scripts and applications simultaneously in our system, so
as to trigger the application behaviors for analysis. After
analyzing about 2100 suspicious apps of Real-World, we
have excluded most of them. We find that there are ICCs
in 163 application pairs without suspicious behavior. For all
pairs of applications that have ICCs, there are no sensitive
data in the ICCs of the 121 applications. On the other hand,
there are intent hijacking attacks in the ICCs of sixteen
application pairs, intent spoofing attacks in the ICCs of six
application pairs, and malware collusions in the ICCs of
four application pairs. Table 4 illustrates several unrevealed
instances of the threats mentioned above as well as false
positives identified by SIAT.
Intent hijacking. The TopGoodNightImages (10,000+
downloads) sends out an intent whose extra field stores
the non-sensitive data. While the TraductoresScout
(50,000+ downloads) receives the intent with required at-
tributes and then lets the data leak out from intent into a
log. Thus the data from the TopGoodNightImages can be
sent out of the TraductoresScout, and other sensitive
data will make it even worse.
Intent spoofing. After the Prizmshare receiving the
intent from the PEC2012, it writes the data extracted from
the intent into a file. Even though the PEC2012 can’t write
data to a file by itself due to the lack of the write permission,
the receiver Prizmshare can escalates the privilege for it.
Intent collusion attack. The SimCardManager (10,000+
downloads) sends out an intent with device ID to the re-
ceiver Notepad (1,000,000+ downloads), then the Notepad
receives the intent and stores the extracted device ID into
a file. Since the SimCardManager doesn’t have the per-
missions to store a file and the Notepad neither has the
permission to get the devices ID. Therefore it’s utterly
suspicious that they are complementing the permissions for
each other.
False positive cases. Besides, there are two typical cases
of false positives in existing approaches, which are ad-
dressed by SIAT in Table 4. The Fotoalbumgpslite sends
out an intent whose data has the device’s locations. While
for the silentcamera (5,000,000+ downloads), the location
information in intent is never traced in storage methods
(e.g. Shareference.putString) or other sensitive meth-
ods. Therefore, the sensitive data will not be leaked out
to the receiver. The Lowlevel sends out an URL to the
urlripper, and then the urlripper is able to access the
Internet address. Hence, in SIAT, it is legal for the sender
to utilize the function of other applications owing to its
Internet permission.
5.3 Results for RQ3 (Run-time Performance)
We now evaluate the runtime performance of SIAT with
three datasets, i.e., DroidBench3.0+IccTA, Our Develop-
ments, and Real-World. Since the Monitor and the Analyzer
are two independent components on the workflow of SIAT.
Notably, the actual runtime of Monitor is related to the
lifetime of app, hence we evaluate their runtime overhead
below separately before summing them.
5.3.1 Monitor Performance
Since our Monitor is a modified version of the Android
system at framework layer, we compute the app runtime
cost on our Monitor and the native Android operating sys-
tem, respectively. Particularly, we have randomly selected
dozens of app-pairs that can launch various ICC attacks
from the three datasets mentioned above, respectively. Also,
to achieve the accurate runtime interval, we have inserted
related time-stamped recording codes in a variety of crucial
APIs in the Monitor and apps. It is worth noting that the
runtime cost of each part on Android in Figure 8 represents
the recorded app execution time at the same APIs after
we running apps without the Monitor. We then run apps
under theMonitor and the Android native operating system,
respectively. We divide the Monitor module into four parts
according to the five steps in Section 4.1 to calculate and
compare the time cost separately. We run apps on two
systems about twenty times, respectively, and adopt the
average value as the final execution time.
Figure 8 shows the evaluation results for each part. As
we can see in Figure 8(a), the time overhead of Real-World
is apparently longer than the others in that the real world
apps maintain more complex and complete functionalities
that lead to more ICC paths. Specifically, both in the transfer
intent and check taint processes, the functions for Monitor
almost doesn’t incur any runtime overhead compared with
original Android. The set taint process leads to about 0.3ms
overhead due to the import of TaintDroid functions. The
major runtime cost is incurred by the check intent process
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Fig. 8. The comparison of app runtime in various parts between Monitor and Android on different datasets.
in Monitor, which exploits the reflective calls to figure out
the component who sends the intent. Nevertheless, the
overhead is less than 1ms and thus is negligible for the end-
users.
5.3.2 Analyzer Performance
Figure 9(a) depicts the total time cost of analyzing multiple
app-pairs with our Analyzer as the number of app-pairs
increases. Obviously, the entire time cost increases almost
linearly along with the number of app-pairs. Thanks to
the model deflation technology aforementioned, the average
time cost is less than 100ms per app-pair. The time cost of
app-pairs in Real-World rises sharply when the number of
app-pairs reaches five, owing to some large size apps that
generate more complex models. While most of the app-
pairs from DroidBench3.0+IccTA and Our Development
only have simple structures and functions used for exper-
imental purposes.
To investigate the influence of app size in-depth, we
analyze a variety of app size dependent factors that affect
the time cost, such as the number of models, the size of
log files, the amount of codes, and so on. We find that
the number of models is the most influential factor. In this
regard, we perform an experiment which takes about 13.7s
to analyze a log file containing about 200 models (including
attack and normal models), indicating an average time cost
of 68.5ms per model.
Figure 9(b) further illustrates the average time cost of an-
alyzing the logs of 140 different app-pairs with the Analyzer
in twenty runs. These 140 different app-pairs are randomly
chosen from the datasets. The x axis is the serial number
identifying every app-pair. The y axis shows the average
analysis time cost of every app-pair. In consistent with
Figure 9, the time cost of the DroidBench3.0+IccTA and Our
Developments concentrates on the lower time region less
than 60ms. In contrast, the time cost of analyzing the logs of
the app-pairs from Real-World dataset is much longer than
others due to the large number of models incurred by their
sophisticated functions. Therefore, by summing the runtime
cost of the four parts of the Monitor in Figure 8 and the time
cost of single app-pair in Analyzer in Figure 9, the overall
time overhead for processing single app-pair is less than
200ms.
6 DISCUSSION
Although we made the first attempt to identify the ICC
attacks by migrating TaintDroid, there are also limitations.
Firstly, to best suit our requirements, we have revised
some functions and classes of TaintDroid at method-level
and file-level for overcoming the challenge of ensuring the
efficiency of tracking tainted data in intent communications.
Secondly, there is a necessary ongoing improvement for
SIAT. Since the TaintDroid supports up to Android 4.3,
the current version of SIAT is based on AOSP version
4.3. Nevertheless, We have checked and confirmed that
over 96% of apps that we have collected randomly from
the Google Play market still can run on Android 4.3 with
SIAT. One essential next effort for us is to migrate the
TaintDroid from the Dalvik VM based Android system to
the Runtime based Android system, to retain the func-
tionality of SIAT for future use. Also, we can migrate the
state-of-the-art fine-grained taint analysis tool for Android
Runtime analysis, e.g., TaintMan [34] and TaintART [29], to
intent communications and then integrate it into SIAT via
the intent primitives. On the other hand, neither the run-
time permission control model built since Android 6.0, nor
the increased number of Android permissions, e.g., about
104 permissions in Android 4.3, about 163 permissions in
Android 10, has affections on the implementation of SIAT,
owing to its adaptivity and extendibility.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the design and implementation
of the SIAT, which provides real-time systematic tracking
of privacy-sensitive data and attack visibility into how
the collaborative malicious behaviors take place via intent,
based on its two crucial modules: Monitor and Analyzer.
SIAT makes the first attempt to revise the TaintDroid both
at method-level and file-level, to migrate it to the app-pair
ICC paths identification both at the data flow and control
flow. Compared to state-of-the-art approaches, the SIAT can
achieve about 25%∼200% accuracy improvements with 1.0
precision and 0.98 recall at the cost of negligible runtime
overhead.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is partially supported by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61872130,
61872133, and 61632009; Science and Technology Project of
Hunan Provincial Department of Communications under
Grant No.201928; Key R & D Projects in Changsha under
Grant No.kq1907103.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 13
The Number of App-pairs
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Ti
m
e(m
s)
0
500
1000
1500 Total analysis time of app-pairs from DroidBench3.0+IccTA
Total analysis time of app-pairs from Our Developments
Total analysis time of app-pairs from Real-World apps
(a) Varying Number of App-pairs.
Serial Number of App-pair
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Ti
m
e(m
s)
50
100
150
200 DroidBench3.0+IccTA
Our Developments
Real-World apps
(b) Single App-pair.
Fig. 9. The time cost of Analyzer under various app-pairs.
REFERENCES
[1] Droidbench-iccta. https://github.com/secure-software-engineering/DroidBench/tree/iccta.
[2] Droidbench3.0. https://github.com/secure-software-engineering/DroidBench.
[3] F-measure. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F1 score.
[4] Google play market. http://paly.google.com/store/apps/.
[5] logcat command-line tool — android studio.
https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/logcat.html.
[6] monkeyrunner. https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkeyrunner.
[7] Steven Arzt, Siegfried Rasthofer, Christian Fritz, Eric Bodden,
Alexandre Bartel, Jacques Klein, Yves Le Traon, Damien Octeau,
and Patrick Mcdaniel. Flowdroid: Precise context, flow, field,
object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for android
apps. Acm Sigplan Notices, 49(6):259–269, 2014.
[8] Hamid Bagheri, Alireza Sadeghi, Joshua Garcia, and Sam Malek.
Covert: Compositional analysis of android inter-app permission
leakage. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 41(9):866–886,
2015.
[9] Hamid Bagheri, Alireza Sadeghi, Reyhaneh Jabbarvand, and Sam
Malek. Practical, formal synthesis and automatic enforcement of
security policies for android. In 2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP DSN,
pages 514–525. IEEE, 2016.
[10] Amiangshu Bosu, Fang Liu, Danfeng Daphne Yao, and Gang
Wang. Collusive data leak and more: Large-scale threat analysis
of inter-app communications. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on
AsiaCCS, pages 71–85. ACM, 2017.
[11] Sven Bugiel, Lucas Davi, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Thomas Fischer,
and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. Xmandroid: A new android evolution
to mitigate privilege escalation attacks. Technische Universita¨t
Darmstadt, Technical Report TR-2011-04, 2011.
[12] Sven Bugiel, Stephen Heuser, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. Flexible
and fine-grained mandatory access control on android for diverse
security and privacy policies. In Presented as part of the 22nd
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 131–146, 2013.
[13] Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Kate Greenwood, and David
Wagner. Analyzing inter-application communication in android.
In Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile systems,
applications, and services, pages 239–252. ACM, 2011.
[14] Lucas Davi, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and
Marcel Winandy. Privilege escalation attacks on android. In inter-
national conference on Information security, pages 346–360. Springer,
2010.
[15] William Enck, Peter Gilbert, Seungyeop Han, Vasant Tendulkar,
Byung-Gon Chun, Landon P Cox, Jaeyeon Jung, Patrick McDaniel,
and Anmol N Sheth. Taintdroid: an information-flow tracking
system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones. ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 32(2):5, 2014.
[16] William Enck, Machigar Ongtang, and Patrick Mcdaniel. Under-
standing android security. IEEE Security & Privacy, 7(1):50–57,
2009.
[17] Roee Hay, Omer Tripp, and Marco Pistoia. Dynamic detection
of inter-application communication vulnerabilities in android. In
Proceedings of the 2015 International Symposium on Software Testing
and Analysis, pages 118–128. ACM, 2015.
[18] Ryan Johnson, Mohamed Elsabagh, Angelos Stavrou, and Jeff
Offutt. Dazed droids: A longitudinal study of android inter-app
vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2018 on AsiaCCS, pages 777–
791. ACM, 2018.
[19] Xu Ke, Yingjiu Li, and Robert H. Deng. Iccdetector: Icc-based
malware detection on android. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics & Security, 11(6):1252–1264, 2017.
[20] William Klieber, Lori Flynn, Amar Bhosale, Limin Jia, and Lujo
Bauer. Android taint flow analysis for app sets. In Proceedings of
the 3rd ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on the State of the Art
in Java Program Analysis, pages 1–6. ACM, 2014.
[21] Youn Kyu Lee, Jae Young Bang, Gholamreza Safi, Arman Shah-
bazian, Yixue Zhao, and Nenad Medvidovic. A sealant for inter-
app security holes in android. In 2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International
Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pages 312–323. IEEE,
2017.
[22] Li Li, Alexandre Bartel, Tegawende´ F Bissyande´, Jacques Klein,
and Yves Le Traon. Apkcombiner: Combining multiple android
apps to support inter-app analysis. In IFIP International Information
Security and Privacy Conference, pages 513–527. Springer, 2015.
[23] Li Li, Alexandre Bartel, Tegawende´ F Bissyande´, Jacques Klein,
Yves Le Traon, Steven Arzt, Siegfried Rasthofer, Eric Bodden,
Damien Octeau, and Patrick McDaniel. Iccta: Detecting inter-
component privacy leaks in android apps. In Proceedings of the 37th
International Conference on Software Engineering-Volume 1, pages
280–291. IEEE Press, 2015.
[24] Fang Liu, Haipeng Cai, Gang Wang, Danfeng Yao, Karim O
Elish, and Barbara G Ryder. Mr-droid: A scalable and prioritized
analysis of inter-app communication risks. In 2017 IEEE Security
and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 189–198. IEEE, 2017.
[25] Long Lu, Zhichun Li, Zhenyu Wu, Wenke Lee, and Guofei Jiang.
Chex: statically vetting android apps for component hijacking vul-
nerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, pages 229–240. ACM, 2012.
[26] Damien Octeau, Daniel Luchaup, Matthew Dering, Somesh Jha,
and Patrick McDaniel. Composite constant propagation: Applica-
tion to android inter-component communication analysis. In Pro-
ceedings of the 37th International Conference on Software Engineering-
Volume 1, pages 77–88. IEEE Press, 2015.
[27] Damien Octeau, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Alexandre Bartel,
Eric Bodden, Jacques Klein, and Yves Le Traon. Effective inter-
component communication mapping in android: An essential step
towards holistic security analysis. In Presented as part of the 22nd
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 543–558, 2013.
[28] Siegfried Rasthofer, Steven Arzt, and Eric Bodden. A machine-
learning approach for classifying and categorizing android sources
and sinks. In NDSS, volume 14, page 1125. Citeseer, 2014.
[29] Mingshen Sun, Tao Wei, and John CS Lui. Taintart: A practical
multi-level information-flow tracking system for android runtime.
In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 331–342, 2016.
[30] Yutaka Tsutano, Shakthi Bachala, Witawas Srisa-An, Gregg
Rothermel, and Jackson Dinh. An efficient, robust, and scalable ap-
proach for analyzing interacting android apps. In 2017 IEEE/ACM
39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pages
324–334. IEEE, 2017.
[31] Fengguo Wei, Sankardas Roy, Xinming Ou, et al. Amandroid:
A precise and general inter-component data flow analysis frame-
work for security vetting of android apps. In Proceedings of the 2014
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 1329–1341. ACM, 2014.
[32] Daoyuan Wu, Yao Cheng, Debin Gao, Yingjiu Li, and Robert H
Deng. Sclib: A practical and lightweight defense against compo-
nent hijacking in android applications. In Proceedings of the Eighth
ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, pages
299–306. ACM, 2018.
[33] Kun Yang, Jianwei Zhuge, Yongke Wang, Lujue Zhou, and Haixin
Duan. Intentfuzzer: detecting capability leaks of android appli-
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 14
cations. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM symposium on Information,
computer and communications security, pages 531–536. ACM, 2014.
[34] Wei You, Bin Liang, Wenchang Shi, Peng Wang, and Xiangyu
Zhang. Taintman: An art-compatible dynamic taint analysis
framework on unmodified and non-rooted android devices. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2017.
